This paper studies how the variation in sectoral productivities shapes the sectoral composition of the Spanish economy from 1980 to 2015. I first document an asymmetric behavior of sectoral productivities: the productivity of services declines over time, whereas the productivity of manufacturing increases until the 1990s, before slowing down. I feed the path of sectoral productivities observed in the data into a model of structural transformation with two sectors (services and manufacturing) which are connected by an Input-Output matrix. The model reproduces the variation of the gross output services share of the Spanish economy between 1980 and 2015. The model implies that -even absent changes in the trends of sectoral productivities -the annual growth rate of GDP between 2015 and 2050 shrinks by 0.6 percentage points with respect to the average growth rate between 1980 and 2015. Hence, annual GDP growth would decline from 2.3% to 1.7%. If sectoral productivities were to equal the levels observed in the Euro Area between 1980 and 2015, the average growth rate of Spanish GDP between 2015 and 2050 would be 2.1%.
Introduction
Over time advanced economies experience a process of structural transformation, in which the sectoral composition of economic activity shifts from the manufacturing sector into services (Kongsamut et Second, I look at the dynamics of aggregate and sectoral productivities between 1980 and 2015. I uncover a set of novel facts: (i) aggregate value added productivity was increasing in the 1980s at an annual growth rate similar to the one observed in the United States, before experiencing a stagnant period of no growth during the 1990s. From then on, aggregate productivity started declining at a steady rate. Overall, the level of aggregate productivity in 2015 equals the level in 1980, implying that on average productivity did not grow throughout these thirty-five years. Then, (ii) the dynamics of aggregate productivity masks vast heterogeneity in sectoral productivities. On the one hand, manufacturing productivity grew at an average annual rate of 0.6% between 1980 and 2015. This increase is mainly concentrated between 1980 and 1995, in which the growth rate reached a peak average rate of 2.3%. From 1995 on, manufacturing productivity has been stagnant until the early 2000, and then dropped down over the last decade. On the other hand, services productivity was fairly constant during the 1980s, and from then on has been decreasing at a stable pace. Overall Baumol (1967) disease mechanism similar to the one emphasized by Ngai and Pissarides (2007) , which builds on two ingredients: as long as (i) manufacturing productivity increases more rapidly than the pro- Baumol (1967) disease mechanism similar to the one emphasized by Ngai and Pissarides (2007) , which builds on two ingredients: as long as (i) manufacturing productivity increases more rapidly than the pro- the same path of sectoral productivities observed in the data from 1980 to 2015, and compare the implied average annual growth rate of GDP over 1980-2015 and 2015-2050. This approach allows me to isolate the role of rising services in the determination of aggregate productivity over the two periods of interest, while avoiding to impose any additional stance of the future trends of sectoral productivity. In this way, I can ask how much the average growth rate of GDP will change going forward due to the reallocation towards services even in the case there is no variation in the underlying path of sectoral productivities.
The model implies that the rise of services -which is the sector with relatively lower (and even negative) productivity growth -will dampen substantially GDP growth: the average annual GDP growth from 2015 to 2050 will be 0.6 percentage points lower than the average annual GDP growth from 1980 to 2015. Since real GDP grew at an annual rate of 2.3% over the last thirty-five years, the model implies that over the next three decades annual GDP will grow at a rate of 1.7%. Finally, I consider a counterfactual case in which the path of sectoral productivities from 2015 to 2050 follows the path observed in the data in Euro area countries from 1980 to 2015. In this alternative scenario the economy keeps experiencing a rise of the services sector, but with a level of sectoral productivities which is higher than the one observed in the Spanish economy. In this alternative exercise, the model implies that the drop in GDP growth going forward would be very limited, as the average growth rate from 2015 to 2050 would equal 2.1%.
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Hence, if the sectoral productivities of the Spanish economy manages to increase over time, the process of structural transformation would have a much smaller dampening effect of the future path of GDP growth.
Empirical Evidence
This section reports the empirical evidence on both the changes in the sectoral composition of the Spanish economy and the rise of services, and the trends in aggregate and sectoral productivities. 
This section reports the empirical evidence on both the changes in the sectoral composition of the Spanish economy and the rise of services, and the trends in aggregate and sectoral productivities. and 2015. The table shows that the services share of the economy has been rising substantially from the 1980s, generating for instance a 38.4% increase in the services share of gross output between 1980 and 2015. A similar change also characterizes the services share of employment. Instead, the rise of services when looking at the sectoral composition of value added is much more muted, as the overall change is 23.9%. The lower increase of the services share of value added 6 relative to the variation in the services share of gross output is due to the fact that gross output equals the sum of value added and intermediate inputs, and the sectoral composition of intermediate inputs has been also changing dramatically over the recent decades. The services share of intermediate inputs used by the services sector has increased by 21.9% between 1980 and 2005, whereas the analogous share computed over the intermediate inputs used by the manufacturing sector has almost doubled over the same period of interest. Hence, the shifts in the sectoral composition of the Input-Output matrix of the economy add to the variation in the services share of value added to then generate an even larger change in the rise of services at the gross output level. and Rachedi (2019), these trends are roughly in line with the experience of other advanced economies, with the only difference that Spain has been experiencing the process of servicization relatively later, to then catch up at a faster rate.
Then, I turn into the analysis of the dynamics of value added productivity between 1980 and 2015, and again I use information from the World KLEMS Data. I start by looking at the aggregate productivity, and compare the experi-and Rachedi (2019), these trends are roughly in line with the experience of other advanced economies, with the only difference that Spain has been experiencing the process of servicization relatively later, to then catch up at a faster rate.
Then, I turn into the analysis of the dynamics of value added productivity between 1980 and 2015, and again I use information from the World KLEMS Data. I start by looking at the aggregate productivity, and compare the experience of the Spanish economy with that of a selected group of advanced economies:
France, Germany, Italy, Portugal, and the United States. Figure 1 reports the dynamics of aggregate productivity for each of these countries between 1980 and 2015, by normalizing the first observation to one.
Figure 1: Value Added Productivity
Note: This figure shows the level of value added productivity for a group of selected countries (i.e., France, Germany, Italy, Portugal, Spain, and the United States) between 1980 and 2015. The productivities are normalized to be 1 in 1980. Source: World KLEMS Data. Figure 1 shows that the country with the highest growth rate of aggregate productivity between 1980 and 2015 is Germany, with an average annual rate of 1%, and a dramatic acceleration amidst the reunification. After Germany, 8 change in the rise of services at the gross output level. Then, I turn into the analysis of the dynamics of value added productivity between 1980 and 2015, and again I use information from the World KLEMS Data. I start by looking at the aggregate productivity, and compare the experience of the Spanish economy with that of a selected group of advanced economies:
France, Germany, Italy, Portugal, and the United States. Figure 1 reports the dynamics of aggregate productivity for each of these countries between 1980 and 2015, by normalizing the first observation to one. Then, I show that the dynamics of aggregate productivity of the Spanish economy mask a vast heterogeneity in the sectoral trends of value added TFP. Figure   2 reports the productivities of aggregate value added, services value added, and manufacturing value added, together with a measure of aggregate value added productivity that considers total output as just the sum of services and manufacturing. The first observation is that as manufacturing and services account for a 9 1980 and 1995 have been lost over the following two decades. This evidence is consistent with that of Gopinath et al. (2017) and Garcia-Santana et al. (2020) , that pointed out how rising misallocation of resources has been driving down the level of productivity of the Spanish economy.
Then, I show that the dynamics of aggregate productivity of the Spanish economy mask a vast heterogeneity in the sectoral trends of value added TFP. Figure   2 reports the productivities of aggregate value added, services value added, and manufacturing value added, together with a measure of aggregate value added productivity that considers total output as just the sum of services and manufacturing. The first observation is that as manufacturing and services account for a 9 very large share of total value added, the trend of aggregate productivity coincides with that of the alternative aggregate series which is just based on services and manufacturing. This evidence corroborates the fact that the focus of this paper on just two sectors -services and manufacturing -is able to capture most of the variation in aggregate productivity. The second observation is that manufacturing productivity has been experiencing a dramatic growth until the mid 1990s: the average annual growth rate of manufacturing productivity between 1980 and 1995 is 2.5%. From then on, it went through a decade of no growth, before going down from the late 2000s on. Overall, the annual growth rate of manufacturing productivity between 1980 and 2015 is 0.6%. On the other hand, services productivity has been rather stagnant until the 1990, before decreasing at a constant rate: the annual growth rate of services productivity between 1980 and 2015 is -0.3%. Figure 3 shows that there is a vast heterogeneity in the growth rates of value added productivity within the services sector. For instance, the annual growth rate of the productivity of professional services is -3.2%. Similar highly negative growth rates characterize also the accommodation and food services, which have an annual rate for their productivity that equals -2.1%. On the other hand, there are few services industries with booming productivity, such as information services, whose value added TFP has been increasing at an average annual rate of 0.8%.
Figure 4: Services Productivity Gap with Germany and the United States
Note: This figure shows the wedge of the change in productivity at the sectoral level for different services industries (i.e., wholesale and retail trade, transportation services, accommodation and food services, information services, financial services, real estate services, professional services, government and public services, education services, health services, and other services) of the Spanish economy between 1980 and 2015 and the change in productivity observed for the same set of industries and over the same period of time in Germany and the United States. Source: World KLEMS Data.
I then compute the average annual growth rate for the productivity of each of these industries, and compare it to the analogous moments for the same set of industries of Germany and the United States. In this way, I derive a measure 12 of the productivity gap, that is, the difference between the growth rate of a given industry in Spain relative to the growth rate of the same industry in either Germany or the United States. A positive number suggests that a given industry grows faster in Spain than elsewhere, whereas a negative number suggests that the improvements in the productivity of that industry in Spain are lower than in Figure 3 shows that there is a vast heterogeneity in the growth rates of value added productivity within the services sector. For instance, the annual growth rate of the productivity of professional services is -3.2%. Similar highly negative growth rates characterize also the accommodation and food services, which have an annual rate for their productivity that equals -2.1%. On the other hand, there are few services industries with booming productivity, such as information services, whose value added TFP has been increasing at an average annual rate of 0.8%.
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I then compute the average annual growth rate for the productivity of each of these industries, and compare it to the analogous moments for the same set of industries of Germany and the United States. In this way, I derive a measure of the productivity gap, that is, the difference between the growth rate of a given industry in Spain relative to the growth rate of the same industry in either Germany or the United States. A positive number suggests that a given industry grows faster in Spain than elsewhere, whereas a negative number suggests that the improvements in the productivity of that industry in Spain are lower than in foreign economies. Figure 
Model
The economy is populated by an infinitely-lived risk-neutral 2 representative household which supplies inelastically labor N t and has preferences over consumption C t , such as it maximizes the expected discounted life-time utility
1 The productivity gap of the public sector vis-á-vis Germany could be driven by different accounting standards used to compute the number of federal public employees. For an analysis of the components of the public sector gross output and value added -and their changes over time -see Moro and Rachedi (2018) .
2 Since the quantitative analysis is derived on a sequence of steady-state, the risk aversion of the household does not alter the results of the paper. For studies on the business cycle implications of structural transformation models, see Moro (2012 Moro ( , 2015 , , and Rubini and Moro (2019), and also Moro and Valdes (2019) for a review of the literature.
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where β is the time discount of households. Aggregate consumption is defined as
in which C s,t is services consumption goods, C m,t is manufacturing consumption goods, ω C denotes the share of services in the CES aggregator, and ν C is the elasticity of substitution between services and manufactured consumption goods.
Accordingly, the budget constraint of the representative household reads
in which P s,t amd P m,t denote the price of services and manufacturing, respec-of the productivity gap, that is, the difference between the growth rate of a given industry in Spain relative to the growth rate of the same industry in either Germany or the United States. A positive number suggests that a given industry grows faster in Spain than elsewhere, whereas a negative number suggests that the improvements in the productivity of that industry in Spain are lower than in foreign economies. Figure 
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in which P s,t amd P m,t denote the price of services and manufacturing, respectively, whereas I set the wage to unity as it is the numeraire of the economy. The household consumes services and manufacturing consumption goods such as this optimal condition holds 
where P H,s,t is the price of intermediate inputs used in the services sector, which
where P is the price of intermediate inputs used in the services sector, which final-good firm produces gross output Y s,t with a Cobb-Douglas technology 
where P H,s,t is the price of intermediate inputs used in the services sector, which on holds 
where P H,s,t is the price of intermediate inputs used in the services sector, which yields the following standard first-order conditions for labor
and intermediate inputs
The 
which yields the optimal amount of services and manufacturing intermediate inputs to purchase
and 
and
and also implicitly defines the price of total services intermediate inputs P H,s,t as inputs H s,t with the CES aggregator 
and also implicitly defines the price of total services intermediate inputs P H,s,t as
Analogously, in the manufacturing sector the representative final-good firm produces gross output Y m,t with a Cobb-Douglas technology 
where P H,m,t is the price of intermediate inputs used in the services sector. The standard first-order condition for labor equals
and the optimal condition for intermediate inputs is
The bundle of intermediate inputs H m,t is purchased from the intermediateinput producer, which uses the CES aggregator
which yields the optimal amount of services and manufacturing intermediate
Analogously, in the manufacturing sector the representative final-good firm produces gross output Y m,t with a Cobb-Douglas technology
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and again implicitly defines the price of total manufacturing intermediate inputs
In this setup, Equations (11), (12), (20), and (21) characterize the Input-
Output of the economy. The optimal conditions define a mechanism analogous to that of the first-order condition of consumption, in which an increase in the relative price of services raises the share of services within the Input-Output 
In this setup, Equations The resource constraint at the sectoral level implies that the gross output is
In this setup, Equations (11) The resource constraint at the sectoral level implies that the gross output is split into consumption goods or intermediate inputs used by either industry, that
is 
In this setup, Equations 
In this setup, Equations The resource constraint at the sectoral level implies that the gross output is split into consumption goods or intermediate inputs used by either industry, that 
In this setup, Equations (11) The resource constraint at the sectoral level implies that the gross output is split into consumption goods or intermediate inputs used by either industry, that is 
In this setup, Equations (11) Output of the economy. The optimal conditions define a mechanism analogous to that of the first-order condition of consumption, in which an increase in the relative price of services raises the share of services within the Input-Output matrix, as long as the elasticities of substitution of intermediate inputs across sectors ν S amd ν M are below one.
The resource constraint at the sectoral level implies that the gross output is split into consumption goods or intermediate inputs used by either industry, that is
Finally, the labor market clearing posits that the labor endowment of the house-18 hold equals the sum of the sectoral employment
under the implicit assumption that labor is perfectly mobile across sectors. First, I characterize the process of structural transformation, and isolate it by looking at the variation in the services share of value added. Under the assumptions that the production of the final good only requires labor, so that α S = α M = 1, then sectoral prices equal the inverse of sectoral productivities, that is, P s,t = 1/A s,t and P m,t = 1/A m,t , and the relative price of services in terms of manufacturing goods equals the ratio between manufacturing and services productivity, that is, Ps,t Pm,t = Am,t As,t . Thus, the relative price of services increases when the manufacturing sector becomes more productive than the services sector.
The Rise of Services: An Analytical Characterization
In this setup, it turns out that the services share of value added coincides with the services share of employment, that is
hold equals the sum of the sectoral employment
productivity, that is, Ps,t Pm,t = Am,t As,t . Thus, the relative price of services increases when the manufacturing sector becomes more productive than the services sector.
The derivative of the services share of employment with respect to changes in the 19 relative productivity of manufacturing vis-á-vis the productivity of services is ∂ Ns,t Ns,t+Nm,t ∂ Am,t Ngai and Pissarides (2007) . In the analysis, we follow Herrendorf et al. (2013) , and set the elasticity of substitution of consumption across sectors to be below one. The literature on multi-sector models that look at business cycle frequency tends to assume an elasticity of substitution of consumption across sectors above one Pasten et al., 2020) . However, this strand of papers look at the shortterm elasticity of substitution, whereas here the focus is on the long-run complementarities between services and manufacturing. Moreover, Hobijn and Nechio (2019) show how the value of the elasticity depends on the level of disaggregation across sectors: the elasticity is above one only for very fine levels of disaggregation that dig deeper than 2-digit NAICS industries (i.e., the elasticity is above one when considering at least 20 industries). The parameter ν C should not be confused with the elasticity of substitution across varieties used typically by New Keynesian models, or models featuring monopolistic competition . In this strand of the literature, the elasticity governs the substitution of varieties within a sector, whereas I focus on the elasticity of substitution across sectors. 20 relative productivity of manufacturing vis-á-vis the productivity of services is ∂ Ns,t Ns,t+Nm,t ∂ Am,t Ngai and Pissarides (2007) . In the analysis, we follow Herrendorf et al. (2013) , and set the elasticity of substitution of consumption across sectors to be below one. The literature on multi-sector models that look at business cycle frequency tends to assume an elasticity of substitution of consumption across sectors above one Pasten et al., 2020) . However, this strand of papers look at the shortterm elasticity of substitution, whereas here the focus is on the long-run complementarities between services and manufacturing. Moreover, Hobijn and Nechio (2019) show how the value of the elasticity depends on the level of disaggregation across sectors: the elasticity is above one only for very fine levels of disaggregation that dig deeper than 2-digit NAICS industries (i.e., the elasticity is above one when considering at least 20 industries). The parameter ν C should not be confused with the elasticity of substitution across varieties used typically by New Keynesian models, or models featuring monopolistic competition . In this strand of the literature, the elasticity governs the substitution of varieties within a sector, whereas I focus on the elasticity of substitution across sectors. productivity, that is, Ps,t Pm,t = Am,t As,t . Thus, the relative price of services increases when the manufacturing sector becomes more productive than the services sector.
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In this case, the derivatives of the services share of intermediate inputs used in either sector with respect to an increase in the relative productivity of manufacturing can be defined as ∂ Ps,tSs,t Ps,tSs,t+Pm,tMs,t ∂ Am,t
and ∂ Ps,tSm,t Ps,tSm,t+Pm,tMm,t ∂ Am,t
Both derivatives are positive as long as the elasticities of substitution of inputs is below one, that is, ν S < 1 and ν M < 1, which imply that manufacturing and services intermediates are relatively poor substitutes. Also this mechanism build on the Baumol disease channel, but this time the variation in relative productivities affects the sectoral composition of the Input-Output matrix, via a process that Galesi and Rachedi (2019) refer to as services deepening.
Overall, in the model the increase in the relative productivity of manufacturing leads to a rise in both the services share of value added (employment) and
the services share of intermediate inputs, thereby amplifying the increase in the services share of gross output. For this reason, in the quantitative analysis we 21 puts used by the services sector and the manufacturing sector equal respectively
Overall, in the model the increase in the relative productivity of manufactur- values confirm the fact that the service sector is as twice as more intensive in labor than manufacturing. All calibrated parameters are reported in Table 2 . values confirm the fact that the service sector is as twice as more intensive in labor than manufacturing. All calibrated parameters are reported in Table 2 . 
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in either sector by matching the average share of labor in gross output between 1980 and 2015, which yields the values of α S = 0.5217 and α M = 0.2184. 6 These values confirm the fact that the service sector is as twice as more intensive in labor than manufacturing. All calibrated parameters are reported in Table 2 . 23 served in the data in 1980. Finally, I calibrate the share of labor in gross output in either sector by matching the average share of labor in gross output between 1980 and 2015, which yields the values of α S = 0.5217 and α M = 0.2184. 6 These values confirm the fact that the service sector is as twice as more intensive in labor than manufacturing. All calibrated parameters are reported in Table 2 . 
The Spanish Economy from 201to 2050
The results of the previous section on the fact that the model-implied path for the services share of gross output between 1980 and 2015 tracks remarkably well the which means that this version of the model accounts for 62% of the the rise of the services share in gross output observed in the data. Instead, the predictions of this paper are based on a structural approach, in which the model derives endogenously the future path of aggregate productivity and GDP given exogenous measures of sectoral TFP.
To perform this exercise, I need to take a stand on the dynamics of sectoral productivities between 2015 and 2050, as the sectoral composition of the economy 26 -and the implied paths for aggregate productivity and GDP -depend crucially on this choice. Hence, I take a very transparent approach: I assume that from 2015 to 2050 the paths of sectoral productivities equal exactly the trends observed in the data between 1980 and 2015. In this way, the comparison of the variation in GDP growth between the two periods of interest does not hinge on any underlying variation in sectoral productivities, but only depends on the endogenous changes in the sectoral composition of the economy. As the Spanish economy would switch more and more towards the services sector with a relatively lower level of productivity, then the level of aggregate productivity would decrease, dampening the implied GDP growth of the economy. Table 3 reports the results of the exercise. First, it is worth noticing that the model implies that in 2050 the services share of gross output will be 80%, well above the 67.6% observed in the data as of 2015. Hence, the Spanish economy will become even more intense in the services sector, and the low productivity of services would dampen the overall level of aggregate productivity. Indeed, the model implies that from 2015 to 2050 the average annual growth of Spanish GDP intermediate inputs.
The results of the previous section on the fact that the model-implied path for the services share of gross output between 1980 and 2015 tracks remarkably well the dynamics of the share observed in the data guarantees that the model is an ideal laboratory to look at the causes and implications of structural transformation for the Spanish economy. Hence, we use the model to look at the implications Instead, the predictions of this paper are based on a structural approach, in which the model derives endogenously the future path of aggregate productivity and GDP given exogenous measures of sectoral TFP.
To perform this exercise, I need to take a stand on the dynamics of sectoral productivities between 2015 and 2050, as the sectoral composition of the economy model implies that in 2050 the services share of gross output will be 80%, well above the 67.6% observed in the data as of 2015. Hence, the Spanish economy will become even more intense in the services sector, and the low productivity of services would dampen the overall level of aggregate productivity. Indeed, the model implies that from 2015 to 2050 the average annual growth of Spanish GDP would be 0.6 percentage point lower than what it has been between 1980 and 2015. This result implies that if the GDP growth observed in the data between 1980 and 2015 has been 2.3%, going forward over the next three decades the growth rate would slow down to 1.9%.
What would be the growth rate of GDP if there were no changes in the Input-Output matrix from 2015 to 2050? In this case, the rise of the services share of gross output would be around 75%, much lower than in the baseline case. As a result, the dampening of the annual GDP growth would also be less relevant: the model without services deepening implies that annual GDP growth would slow down from an average value of 2.3% between 1980 and 2015, to 2.1% between 2015 and 2050. Finally, I look at the predictions of the model from 2015 to 2050 by assuming that the sectoral productivities will follow the trends observed between 1980 and 2015 in the Euro area countries. In particular, I consider the trend of services and manufacturing industries averaging the values observed in Austria, Belgium, Finally, I look at the predictions of the model from 2015 to 2050 by assuming that the sectoral productivities will follow the trends observed between 1980 and 2015 in the Euro area countries. In particular, I consider the trend of services and manufacturing industries averaging the values observed in Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, and the Netherlands. 7 In this case, the growth rate of manufacturing productivity and the growth rate of services productivity is 0.8% and 0.2%, above the value observed respectively in the Spanish economy: 0.6% and -0.3%. If I feed these trends in the model, then the relatively higher level of productivities imply a milder drop in GDP growth: the average annual GDP growth from 2015 to 2050 will be 2.1%, just 0.2 percentage points the average observed in the previous three decades. 7 These countries are the only Euro-area economies with information on services and manufacturing productivity dating back to the 1980 in the World KLEMS database.
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A natural question that emerges is whether the negative effects on aggregate productivity due to the rise of services are larger in Spain vis-á-vis other economies. To answer this question, I can compare the change in aggregate productivity due to the reallocation of employment (or economic activity more broadly) across sectors such as the share of manufacturing drops by 1% and the share of services rises by 1%. In this case, aggregate productivity growth would drop by -0.9%, which is the difference in the Spanish economy between the average productivity growth of manufacturing of 0.6% and the average productivity growth of services of -0.3%. A similar reallocation of resources in Euro area countries would imply a milder drop of aggregate productivity of 0.6%, which is the difference between the average productivity growth of manufacturing of 0.8% and the average productivity growth of services of 0.2% observed in Euro area countries.
Overall, this exercise makes three main points: (i) the rise in the services share of the Spanish economy together with the fact that services are characterized by a relatively lower sectoral productivity will imply that going forward the aggregate productivity and GDP growth of Spain will slow down, (ii) if the paths of sectoral productivities of the Spanish economy manage to improve over time to the similar levels observed in other Euro area countries, then the variation in the sectoral composition of the economy towards the services sector would have a limited effect of the future path of GDP growth, and (iii) since the difference in productivity growth between manufacturing and services is larger in Spain than in sectoral productivities observed in other large European countries between 1980-2015.
Finally, I look at the predictions of the model from 2015 to 2050 by assuming that the sectoral productivities will follow the trends observed between 1980 and 2015 in the Euro area countries. In particular, I consider the trend of services and manufacturing industries averaging the values observed in Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, and the Netherlands. 7 In this case, the growth rate of manufacturing productivity and the growth rate of services productivity is 0.8% and 0.2%, above the value observed respectively in the Spanish economy: 0.6% and -0.3%. If I feed these trends in the model, then the relatively higher level of productivities imply a milder drop in GDP growth: the average annual GDP growth from 2015 to 2050 will be 2.1%, just 0.2 percentage points the average observed in the previous three decades.
by a relatively lower sectoral productivity will imply that going forward the aggregate productivity and GDP growth of Spain will slow down, (ii) if the paths of sectoral productivities of the Spanish economy manage to improve over time to the similar levels observed in other Euro area countries, then the variation in the sectoral composition of the economy towards the services sector would have a limited effect of the future path of GDP growth, and (iii) since the difference in productivity growth between manufacturing and services is larger in Spain than in other economies, then the Spanish economy is relatively more exposed to the dampening of GDP growth due to the rise of services.
6 Conclusions
This paper shows that the rise of the services sector in the Spanish economy may dampen GDP growth by 0.6 percentage points in the future, from an average annual growth rate of 2.3% between 1980 and 2015 to a rate of 1.7% between 2015 and 2050. This result is due to the fact that the services sector is much less productive than manufacturing, and therefore the shifts of economy activity towards services would dampen aggregate productivity and therefore GDP growth. However, if sectoral productivities were to equal the levels observed in the Euro Area between 1980 and 2015, the average growth rate of Spanish GDP between 2015 and 2050 would be 2.1%. Most of the gap of the productivity of the Spanish services sector with respect to other European advanced economies is concentrated in industries such as the professional services and accommodation and food services.
An important caveat of this analysis is that the implications of the model on the growth rate of GDP from 2015 on are derived under the assumption that the path of sectoral productivity going forward equals the one observed in the data from 1980 to 2015. However, the future productivity of the Spanish economy may differ from the historical one because of a change in either the overall level of aggregate TFP (i.e., the part of productivity that is common across sectors), or the level of sectoral TFPs (i.e., the part of productivity which is idiosyncratic to each industry). In future research, I will dig deeper these dynamics to disentangle the contribution of the trends in aggregate productivity vis-á-vis sector-specific productivity to the overall variation in the TFP of the Spanish economy.
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